Our western society has been diverging quickly on the understanding of knowledge. Some feel that it is our personal liberty to know what we want to know and that our individual freedom allows us to ignore experts that have spent a lifetime building up knowledge in a domain. Others argue that all deference must be given to experts and that we are not justified in criticizing experts as our understanding is too limited. They would sacrifice all individual thought and argument at the alter of ’the expert’ on the topic. As neither extreme is viable, how can we have knowledge?

We can’t worship experts, but we can’t throw them under a bus either. Both extremes are fraught with problems, and there should be some balance. Matthew Hutson recently wrote a fascinating article in the MIT Technology Review titled, ’Why you don’t really know what you know’ that provides valuable insight on the topic. I found much of the material in this post from his references and articulation. Early in his article, he states;

One common definition of knowledge is ‘justified true belief’ - facts you can support with data and logic. As individuals, though, we rarely have the time or skills to justify our own beliefs. So what do we really mean we say we know something? Hardwig posed a dilemma: Either much of our knowledge can be held only by a collection, not an individual, or individuals can ‘know’ things they don’t really understand.

Can an individual verify complex knowledge?

As I grow my education and technical expertise in Statistics and Data Science, I recognize the decades of marination that my work in this space has done for my thinking. I see that there are experts in my field that far surpass any abilities that I could have. However, I also understand that I have developed specialized skills that allow me to have a depth of knowledge and understanding that others do not have. Carlo Rovelli’s article helped me realize how difficult it is for most citizens of our planet to deal with probabilistic thought.

When we want to understand complex topics, we romanticize that we can focus and figure out the subject’s truth. In the book Meaning, Michael Polanyi argues that individual validation of knowledge held by experts is fraught with peril.

The popular conception of science says that science is a collection of observable facts that anybody can verify for himself. We have seen this is not true in the case of expert knowledge, like that needed in diagnosing a disease. Moreover, it is not true in the physical sciences. In the first place, for instance, a layman cannot possibly get hold of the equipment for testing a statement of fact in astronomy or in chemistry. Even supposing that he could somehow get the use of an observatory or a chemical laboratory, he would not know how to use the instruments he found there and might very well damage them beyond repair before he had ever made a single observation; and if he should succeed in carrying out an observation to check up on a statement of science and found a result that contradicted it, he could rightly assume that he had made a mistake, as students do in a laboratory when they are learning to use its equipment.

John Hardwig in Epistemic Dependence pushed on this idea of our desire to have our ‘own independent thought’ when he explained that some of us that are talented enough could ’escape reliance on a given expert’ because we can choose where to hold our intellectual autonomy. However, if we were ’to pursue [knowledge] autonomy across the board, [we] would succeed only in holding relatively uninformed, unreliable, crude, untested, and therefore irrational beliefs.’ He then posits his conclusion of rationality, ‘If [we] would be rational, [we] can never avoid some [knowledge] dependence on experts, owing to the fact that I believe more than I can become fully informed about.’

Those of us persuaded by the above arguments should still follow up by asking, ‘How we might validate experts if we are dependent on them?’

How do we validate experts?

The opposite question is not as useful but is often used to repudiate those that appear to believe differently than us. In religion, science, and politics, we often settle on answering the question, ‘How do we invalidate experts?’ To this topic, John Hardwig said;

The layman can propose criticisms and alternatives, but rationally he must allow the expert to dispose of them, for in a conversation with an expert (as opposed to a dialogue among equals), the final court of rational appeal belongs solely to one party, by virtue of that party’s greater competence for and commitment to inquiry into the relevant subject matter. … There are a whole series of ad hominems that permit a layman rationally to refuse to defer to the expert’s opinion. The layman can assert that the expert is not a disinterested, neutral witness; that his interest in the outcome of the discussion prejudices his testimony. Or that he is not operating in good faith-that he is lying, for example, or refusing to acknowledge a mistake in his views because to do so would tend to undermine his claim to special competence. Or that he is covering for his peers or knuckling under to social pressure from others in his field, etc., etc. Such ad hominems are not always fallacious, and they sometimes do ground the rational refusal to defer to the statements of experts.¹ … With the exception-often an important exception-of such ad hominems, I see no way to avoid the conclusion that the rational layman will recognize that, in matters about which there is good reason to believe that there is expert opinion, he ought not to make up his own mind. His stance on these matters will-if he is rational-usually be rational deference to the epistemic authority of the expert.

My wife has a quote in our dining room that is attributed to Eleanor Roosevelt, ‘Great minds talk about ideas; average minds discuss events; small minds talk about people.’ We must discuss the ideas to validate the experts. We should question the idea proposed by the experts instead of calling them names or doubting their intentions. We will not reach the experts’ knowledge depth, but we should ‘at least scratch the surface of the’ knowledge or idea. If we don’t, we will ‘fall for anything.’²

Protecting and Progressing our Knowledge

Rationality and faith require each of us to balance between listening to others and thinking on our own. I believe this concept is what Alma was trying to put forth when he discussed faith in Alma 32. As your read his discussion of faith and knowledge, think about it in the context of balancing expert and personal knowledge. Can you see Alma’s seed being the same thing as ‘scratching the surface?’

Faith is not to have a perfect knowledge of things; therefore if ye have faith ye hope for things which are not seen, which are true. Now, as I said concerning faith—that it was not a perfect knowledge—even so it is with my words. Ye cannot know of their surety at first, unto perfection, any more than faith is a perfect knowledge. But behold, if ye will awake and arouse your faculties, even to an experiment upon my words, and exercise a particle of faith, yea, even if ye can no more than desire to believe, let this desire work in you, even until ye believe in a manner that ye can give place for a portion of my words. And now, behold, is your knowledge perfect? Yea, your knowledge is perfect in that thing, and your faith is dormant; and this because you know, for ye know that the word hath swelled your souls, and ye also know that it hath sprouted up, that your understanding doth begin to be enlightened, and your mind doth begin to expand.

Most likely, we will never have a perfect knowledge of all the things associated with any idea we seek to understand. However, we can have perfect knowledge in ’that thing’, which will help us know which expert sources we should leverage to move forward in faith and understanding. When our understanding is enlightened and our mind is expanded, we can move forward, standing on others’ shoulders.

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